Godspeed, Sec Jesse (Features)

I met Sec. Jesse the first time last February 2012, when we presented the findings of our security sector research with him. We set a meeting but were not really expecting that he would see us in person. Based on our experience with other departments, only the undersecretaries and assistant secretaries would be sent to meet us. We were pleasantly surprised, however, when Sec Jesse himself met us in a practically one-on-one discussion about our findings, centering on issues that affected local government units (LGUs) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). It was a short meeting but was very frank, candid, and straightforward. He had no pretensions, no air, no trappings of having his position in his head. The tone of the entire discussion was finding ways to move reforms forward. At the end of the meeting, he gave us an assignment that we were supposed to submit to him. We left his office feeling challenged and elated, and looking forward to scheduling a second meeting with him to submit our assignment.

 

The heart of Sec Jesse’s reform agenda is to strengthen government institutions, to make the basic infrastructures of democracy work. His advocacy centers on changing political practices by reforming political institutions. His statement "(i)t is not enough for a government official to be good. The system or the institution has to force him to be good" best captures this agenda. Our assignment, therefore, centers on this agenda.

 

...it is heartwarming to learn that his effect on me is the same with others... My heart sank upon learning the sad news. But it is heartwarming to learn that his effect on me is the same with others -- we are all inspired by his commitment to make the government work for the people.

 

While we all feel sad for his passing, life has to go on. And I believe the best way to honor his memory is to continue with the assignment he gave us, and ensure that reforms indeed move forward in the institutions he dedicated his life for. 

 

Go with God, good Secretary. The brief encounter we had is and will always be cherished.

 

PNP REFORM

 

In continuing and expanding the scope of our research on the security sector, we had the pleasure of meeting with PNP officers in Cebu over the weekend. Our roundtable discussion (RTD) centered on needed institutional reforms to insulate the police from partisan political interests. Under Republic Act 6975, the governor "recommends" to the PNP leadership who should be appointed as PNP Provincial Director (PD), while mayors exercise "operational supervision and control over PNP units in their respective jurisdiction…" (Xec 51, RA 6975). These two provisions of RA 6975 can compromise the independence of the local police.

 

On the one hand, the PD is beholden to the governor and must remain in his/her good graces, lest the governor issue a request for "transfer order."

 

Mayors, on the other hand, can use variety of means to ensure that the local police understands "who’s the boss." The PNP officers, during our meeting, recounted a case wherein a mayor cut the telephone and electricity supply of the PNP station to "punish" the local police for not doing his wishes. And this is not an isolated case -- there are similar cases that show the caprice of local chief executives (LCEs). The net effect is that local police is forced to cow down to mayors.

 

Two concrete recommendations that came out of the RTD are worth mentioning here, and in fact, worth pursuing as part of the PNP reform agenda:

 

• Police stations -- the land and the physical structure -- must be owned by the PNP, and not by LGUs. Sufficient operational funds -- for electricity, telephone, gas and other expenditures -- must also be provided by the PNP budget. Having P8,000/month operating fund sounds like a joke, but is actually a reality in some areas. The meager funds necessitate that police units seek support from LCEs or LGUs. This naturally can create unwarranted patronage relations between the local police unit and the LGU.

 

Removing the "ties that bind" between the LCEs and the local police can hopefully give the latter much leeway in performing their jobs better.

 

• Police officers must have clear, available, and operational institutional protection against the influence and power of LCEs. There had been cases when PNP officers who were in the thick of an investigation prior to an arrest were told to "stand down" by the LCE or by a government official higher in rank. In other cases, the police officer was requested to let up the heat against a suspected criminal ("i-balato"). This practice not only demoralizes especially upright, good police officers, it also strengthens the bad practice of creating untouchables, and furthering the "culture of impunity."

 

Officers who incur the ire of LCEs and are requested to be relieved from duty must also be accorded due process. Officers who incur the ire of LCEs (for instance, if PNP operations begin to affect the "business" of the mayor) and are requested to be relieved from duty must also be accorded due process. There must be "just cause" to justify their relief; or there should be a mechanism where the police officer can also request for investigation of the mayor, without jeopardizing his promotion/career in the service. 

 

These ideas, as mentioned, surfaced in the course of a lively discussion with PNP officers. Next week, we’ll meet with another set of PNP officers from another province. I hope the meeting will again generate more ideas as regards filling the institutional gaps that affect the PNP from effectively fulfilling its mandate.

 

 

The author is the convener of the ADMU Political Science Department-Working Group on Security Sector Reform. Comments are welcome appleoreta@gmail.com